Minority Studies Center

The Muslim community in Ethiopia

The presence of Muslims in present-day Ethiopia is ancient, predating the establishment of this modern nation-state. The nucleus of the first Muslim community in Ethiopia was formed before the migration of Muslims to Medina. Islam then gradually spread throughout the Ethiopian jungles until it became the dominant religion. However, this expansion soon provoked the ire of Christians and led to a doctrinal/political conflict that lasted for more than six centuries between Muslims and Christians, beginning with the Islamic emirates stretching from Zeila to the movement of Ahmed ibn Ibrahim (Geren) in Harar, and the Ethiopian Christian kingdoms. This conflict ended with the defeat of the Muslims in 1887, due to international intervention by Portugal and the Catholic Church, and the emergence of European colonialism and its dominance over the Horn of Africa.

Muslims in Ethiopia are spread across most geographical regions and among most ethnic groups, with a significant concentration in the eastern, southeastern, and northwestern regions. They comprise various ethnic groups, most notably the Oromo, Somali, Sidamo, and groups from the Amhara and Tigray. The Oromo, who make up nearly half of Ethiopia’s population, are predominantly Muslim, with approximately 80% being Muslim. The Muslim population among the Amhara and Tigray has also grown to over 15%, or approximately three million.

The following table shows the distribution of Muslims across ethnic groups in Ethiopia.

The political presence of Muslims in Ethiopia

The political situation of Muslims in Ethiopia can be summarized in four phases: The first phase, absolute monarchy, which lasted for centuries and ended with the death of King Haile Selassie in 1974, during which the role of Muslims was completely suppressed. The second phase, the rise of the communist regime under Mengistu Haile Mariam, saw the situation of Muslims worsen. The third phase, the era of democratic pluralism, began with the fall of Mengistu’s regime in 1991. The fourth phase, the post-Meles Zenawi era, characterized by political and religious liberalization.

It can be said that the political situation of Muslims in Ethiopia began to improve in 1991 with the fall of Mengistu’s regime.

The constitutional amendment of 1995, which emphasized the separation of religion and state and stipulated that there should be no state religion, also stated in one of its articles that the state should not interfere in religious affairs, nor should religion interfere in state affairs.

This is considered a positive step in recognizing the Muslim community in Ethiopia and correcting the previous situation where Christianity was the official state religion. It reduced the influence of the Church and allowed freedom of worship for both Muslims and Christians. Then, during the era of President Meles Zenawi, which lasted until 2006, the authorities allowed Muslims to deal with matters of personal and family law through laws derived from Islamic Sharia and in special courts. They also permitted the establishment of Muslim schools that teach Islam and Arabic. The current authorities (PMAC) declared that all religions are equal, and the Muslim holiday became an official state holiday.

Zenawi’s government, for the first time, allowed Muslims to participate fully in government work, and his cabinet included 12 Muslim ministers. This reduced the disparities between them and their Christian counterparts. The role of the Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs, which oversaw education, the propagation of Islam, and the construction of mosques, became more active. They benefited greatly from this democratic opening, based on the new Ethiopian constitution, which enshrined the democratic approach to governance.7 The new constitution represented a significant and fundamental change in the structure of the Ethiopian state, as it established and adopted a federal system, dividing Ethiopia into nine regions and nine ethnic groups.

Seven minority groups were granted the right to use their languages ​​in basic education.

Given the importance of education in enabling Muslim youth to attain positions of power within the government, it is noteworthy that prior to the adoption of federalism and Ethiopia’s transformation into a secular state, many Muslim youth were reluctant to enroll in government and formal schools due to the absence of Arabic language instruction and Islamic curricula. This negatively impacted their opportunities for government positions and employment. Consequently, most were engaged in trade, herding, agriculture, and similar activities. As a result, the Muslim population, despite its large numbers, had a limited influence in the political arena and decision-making processes.

Then, with Abiy Ahmed’s rise to power, the rhetoric of reconciliation with Muslims became clearly prominent. Abiy Ahmed’s government contributed to supporting the formation of the Supreme Council of Muslims and recognizing its legitimacy after sixty years of demands. The council was announced in May 2019, and Mufti Sheikh Haji Omar Idris was chosen as its president. Additionally, the first Islamic college was opened.

The position of Muslims in Ethiopia regarding the recent crisis

Firstly, since the recent crisis centered on the Tigray region, which the government claims rebelled against the central government, it’s important to note that the percentage of Muslims in Tigray is the lowest among the four regions with Muslim populations. The Somali region has a Muslim population of approximately 97% (around 5 million people), followed by the Afar region with a Muslim population of approximately 99% (around 1.5 million people), then the Amhara region with a Muslim population of 18%, and finally Tigray with only a 5% Muslim population. These Muslims are scattered across various regions and do not have a specific center of concentration.

Secondly, the crisis is not between a predominantly Muslim region, nor is it related to religion. Rather, it is a power struggle between two ethnic groups—the Tigray and the Amhara—who have alternated in ruling Ethiopia. The Tigrays controlled the state through the central government since the era of Meles Zenawi, who belonged to this ethnic group. Then, with the rise of Abiy Ahmed, the Amhara returned to power in alliance with the Oromo. Abiy Ahmed began targeting Tigrayan leaders on charges of corruption and human rights violations. There is a sense of resentment among the other ethnic groups regarding the Tigrayans’ influence in the state and government, and the privileges they received at the expense of other ethnic groups during their rule. This has led these other ethnic groups to adopt a more passive neutral stance toward the government than to support the Tigrays.

Third, the absence of a unified Islamic bloc, whether in the form of a movement or an Islamic party, has contributed to the diminished voice of Muslims, both in terms of positive influence through dialogue, negotiation, or proposing a peaceful resolution to the crisis. This is especially true given that Muslims are still at the beginning of the process of legitimizing and regulating their status and their official and semi-official religious institutions, despite the occurrence of some violent crises between certain regions and Islamic groups, as happened in the Somali region in 2017, and as happened previously with the Oromo groups, including the restrictions on the movement of one of their leaders, Jawar Mohammed, and the persecution of others.

Fourth, the Oromo people’s support for Abiy Ahmed’s rise to power through their alliance with him may have granted Oromo Muslims advantages within the government and state apparatus, despite the recent strain in relations. This may have placed the group in a dilemma: whether to support the government they helped bring to power or to turn against it and reject its policies, which could threaten internal unity and cohesion. Furthermore, the absence of some Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) leaders may have contributed to the lack of a strong voice, either positive or negative, regarding the recent crisis.

The impact and influence of Muslims in the recent crisis

It is expected that Muslims in Ethiopia will be negatively affected by this recent crisis if it escalates into an armed rebellion or if the current war in the Tigray region transforms into a guerrilla war, draining the state and its resources, inciting unrest, and targeting federal institutions or the national army, especially given the presence of armed militias among most of the major ethnic groups. The situation could potentially escalate to the declaration of a state of war or emergency, the suspension of the constitution, or a military coup, particularly since the Tigrayans have influence within the military establishment. This would return Muslims to the pre-1995 federal constitution status quo. Elections could be canceled or postponed, a scenario that was anticipated in the 2016 elections and has been revived by the current government. It is said that this is the main reason for the outbreak of the recent crisis with Tigray, and it is not unlikely that Abiy Ahmed’s government will resign under internal and external pressure, as happened with Desalegn’s government.

Furthermore, addressing the issues of other ethnic groups in the same manner and with the same policies—such as the Somali region, the Afar people, or even the predominantly Muslim Oromo Liberation Front—will have a negative impact. This would imply that the current government’s policies follow a strategy of picking each group off one at a time and choosing the opportune moment to eliminate it.

Especially given the long-standing accusations against previous governments that they attempted to control and manipulate the Islamist movement by supporting the Ahbash group to infiltrate and lead it. This also involved imposing figures aligned with the state’s agenda to curtail the role and influence of the Muslim community. Furthermore, Abiy Ahmed’s actions in supporting individuals and figures from the American Evangelical Protestant Church to assume positions within his administration further underscore this point.

A positive impact for Muslims in Ethiopia is also expected if the recent crisis leads to a genuine strengthening of the federal system. This would contribute to a redistribution of power that is proportionate to the nine regions in terms of their population, resources, influence, and contributions. This is especially true if Muslims are able to activate the Supreme Council for Muslim Affairs and transform it into an effective institution for supporting, developing, and empowering the Muslim community in Ethiopia to fulfill its duties and responsibilities and contribute alongside the state, civil society organizations, and existing Islamic groups, movements, and Sufi orders.

It is also expected that this recent crisis will have a positive impact if it results in greater moderation of nationalism and the government, the holding of fair elections, and the formation of Islamic parties by Muslims to compete in elections. This would enable Muslims to achieve their aspirations and hopes without needing to operate under non-Islamic umbrellas, institutions, and identities, and without needing grants, gifts, or favors from the state, but rather with pure constitutional rights and privileges granted to every citizen regardless of their ethnicity or religion.

Publisher of the article: The Egyptian Institute for Studies
Link to the article

https://eipss-eg.org/?p=50697